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Renewable Energy and Human Rights Violations: 
Illustrative Cases from Indigenous Territories in 
Panama 
Mary Finley,Brook and Curtis Thomas 
Department of Geography and the Environment, University of Richmond 
Local implementation of international climate policies is frequently obscure. The objective of our research is to 
unpack the "black box" of carbon offsetting as it is being conducted in Latin American indigenous territories. Our 
two case studies of renewable energy projects under construction in Naso and Ngobe villages in western Panama 
show that carbon offsets in oppressive societies have the potential to cause social harm. Our cases illustrate 
processes of green authoritarianism, spatial control, and social restructuring. The private developers constructing 
the Chan 75 and Bonyic dams did not follow international standards for free, prior, and informed consent, and 
state agencies reinforced private rights with physical violence. As the hydro developers await decisions on their 
applications for verification under the Clean Development Mechanism (COM), we recommend COM procedural 
reforms to assure respect for human rights, including the special rights codified in the 2007 UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. If not, project developers could use low-carbon objectives to justifY social 
oppression. Key Words: carbon offsets, hydroelectric dams, Indigenous peoples, Panama, renewable energy. 
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La implementaci6n local de pollticas dimaticas internacionales es frecuentemente oscura. El objetivo de nuestra 
investigaci6n es destapar Ia "caja negra" de las compensaciones por carbono, como estan siendo aplicadas en 
los territorios indfgenas latinoamericanos. Nuestros dos estudios de caso sobre proyectos de energfa renovable 
en contrucci6n en las aldeas Naso y Ngi:>be, en el occidente de Panama, indican que los bonos de carbono en 
sociedades opresivas potencial mente pueden causar dafio social. Nuestros casos ilustran procesos de autoritarismo 
verde, control espacial y reestructuraci6n social. Los empresarios que estan construyendo las represas de Chan 
75 y Bonyic no siguieron los estandares internacionales sobre consentimiento libre, anticipado y consciente, a 
la vez que entidades estatales retorzaban los derechos privados con violencia ffsica. En tanto que los promotores 
del desarrollo hidroelectrico esperan las decisiones sobre sus propuestas para verificaci6n de acuerdo con el 
Mecanismo de Desarrollo Limpio (COM), nosotros recomendamos reformas de procedimiento del COM para 
apuntalar el respeto por los derechos humanos, incluyendo los derechos especiales codificados en Ia Declaraci6n 
de las NU sobre Derechos de los Pueblos Indfgenas. Si no se hace eso, quienes desarrollan este tipo de proyectos 
podrfan usar objetivos orientados hacia la baja en emisiones de carbono para justificar opresi6n social. Palabras 
clave: bonos de carbona, represas hidroelectricas, pueblos ind(genas, Panama, energfa renovable. 
S hould low-carbon development fragment com-munities and disrupt Indigenous peoples' col-lective institutions and subsistence practices? 
Emerging from structural inequities and physical vio-
lence, the two hydro development projects we assess 
potentially extend Radcliffe's (2007) Latin American 
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indigenous geographies of fear, racism, and unevenness 
to the clean ener!,ry sector. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (COM), an in-
ternational framework to reduce greenhouse gas ( GH G) 
emissions as industrial countries finance low-carbon 
projects in developing regions, has the potential to 
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significantly influence global processes. There were 
US$6.5 billion dollars of project-based COM finance 
transferred in 2008 alone (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009). 
By January of 2011, 2,700 validated projects existed 
in seven_ty countries. In spite of a bifurcated mandate 
to promote sustainable development along with GHG 
emissions reductions, the focus of COM regulatory 
tools on measuring carbon (e.g., monitoring method-
ologies, additionality assessment, 1 etc.) limits attention 
to socioeconomic factors ( Capoor and Ambrosi 2009; 
Gilbertson and Reyes 2009; U:ivbrand, Rindefjall, and 
Nordqvist 2009).2 
In this article we assess whether carbon offsets can 
cause social harm. In 2008, the Indigenous Environ-
mental Network (lEN) and Society for Threatened 
Peoples (2008) identified GHG mitigation projects 
they believe violate indigenous rights in acts of carbon 
colonialism, including several Panamanian dam sites. 
lEN's claims, and documents from Cultural Survival 
(e.g., Lutz 2007), spurred our 2009 fieldwork to analyze 
two projects in Naso and Ngobe villages.3 In western 
Panama, renewable energy projects create intense pres-
sure for governance and livelihood transitions (Cordero 
et al. 2006; Paiement 2007; Jordan 2008; Finley-Brook 
and Thomas 2010). 
The central objective of our research is to unpack the 
"black box" of carbon offsetting (Lovell and Liverman 
2010). National and subnational implementation 
of the policies emerging from international climate 
institutions is often opaque (Lovbrand, Rindefjall, and 
Nordqvist 2009; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). Since 
2008, we have completed fieldwork on eleven carbon 
projects in four countries, including Nicaraguan bagasse 
cogeneration, forest carbon and hydroelectric dams 
in Costa Rica and Panama, and Dominican wind de-
velopment. Research methods include semistructured 
interviews with project developers, state officials, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and impacted 
populations. The nineteen interviews contributing 
to this article drew from each of these sectors. Our 
case study approach documents how decision-making 
power and processes influence cost-benefit distribution 
among stakeholders (e.g., host communities, investors, 
government agencies, offset purchasers, etc.). 4 
Naso and Ngobe community members charged the 
Panamanian government with human rights violations 
due to dam construction in their territories. As we 
sought to contextualize their claims within broader 
clean development trends, we uncovered an avoidance 
of issues pertaining to indigenous land and cultural 
rights in COM project documents throughout Latin 
America, even in those located in Mexican ejidos (com-
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munal lands). Academic research addressing injustice 
in Latin American offsets tends to focus on biofuel or 
forestry projects (e.g., Boyd 2009; McAfee and Shapiro 
2010; Hazlewood forthcoming), creating a research gap. 
In popular media (e.g., Dyer 2009), concerns about re-
newable energy COM projects in indigenous territories 
are addressed. 
Although we caution against generalizing from 
our illustrative cases, we recognize similar patterns 
in other indigenous territories (see, e.g., Hale 2002, 
2004; Radcliffe 2007; Baldwin 2009). During hydro 
development, private and state partners often attempt 
to extinguish indigenous land claims (Paiement 2007; 
Jordan 2008). With the rise of offset markets, we argue 
that project developers might use low-carbon objectives 
to justify their demands for local sociocultural change. 
We highlight "stick and carrot" approaches that use 
carbon credits as positive incentives while employing 
physical force to assure project implementation. As 
global environmental change influences expectations 
for energy projects (Zimmerer 2011), we identify a 
resurgence of historical prejudices that categorize 
subsistence practices as inefficient and indigenous 
customs as inferior. Before presenting the details of 
our two case studies, we seek to contextualize events 
in Panama, where state agencies and private firms se-
lectively define sustainable development in renewable 
energy projects in ways that allow them to pursue nco-
liberal agendas while further marginalizing indigenous 
communities. 
Expanding Interests and Inequities in 
Hydro Power 
There is a historic pattern of unequal distribution 
of costs and benefits in large-scale energy projects. 
Hydrologic colonialism is a spatial process imposed by 
big dams: high costs (e.g., ecological degradation, 
resettlement, loss of resource access, etc.) are felt in 
source landscapes and benefits (e.g., electricity, profit, 
etc.) are exported (Bakker 1999; Bonta 2004; Desbiens 
2004; Sneddon and Fox 2008). State agencies have 
long justified large-scale energy projects as essential for 
national economic development, in spite of obvious 
spatial and social inequities. 
We suggest that some large-scale CDMs might 
extend these inequities. Fair distribution and social 
consensus might be sidelined in COM decision making 
because a major goal is to save money: Industrialized 
nations finance mitigation in developing countries 
because it is less expensive than cutting domestic 
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emtsstons (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Gilbertson 
and Reyes 2009; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). For host 
governments, renewable energy COM projects are 
an opportunity to capture foreign investment for the 
expansion of infrastructure (Lokey 2009; Schreuder 
2009), a pressing concern in countries like Panama 
with rapid growth in electrical demand. 
Approximately 60 percent of COM projects create 
renewable energy and the largest COM sector in terms 
of total number of projects is the hydro sector.5 As 
of January 2011, there were 800 COM-verified hydro 
projects globally and 750 in the pipeline.6 Our cases 
involve foreign-financed, large-scale ( > 15 megawatts) 
dams. Multinational firms sponsor a significant share of 
large hydro COM projects (Haya 2007). 
The hydro industry suggests large dams can be so-
cially responsible as well as ecologically friendly (Inter-
national Hydropower Association 2007). The project 
developers in our case studies are Colombia's state util-
ity company (Empresas Publicas de Medellin, or EPM) 
and a Panamanian subsidiary ofU.S.-based AES Corp.7 
Both firms claim to be industry leaders in corporate 
social responsibility (AES-Changuinola 2008; EPM 
2009). Our case studies suggest these firms recast neg-
ative social consequences as economic development in 
ways that are both superficial and harrowingly profound. 
Private-State Energy Sector Partnerships 
Neoliberal economic reforms, such as privatization 
and deregulation, generally expand or reinforce the 
power of multinational firms, and this is certainly 
evident in the energy sector (Ahmed 2010). The 
Central American Electrical Interconnection System 
(SIEPAC), an integrated regional grid under construc-
tion across 2,000 kilometers, required extensive foreign 
private investment. Energy projects linked to SIEPAC, 
including the two Panamanian case studies, fit within 
broader private-state economic development strategies 
to exploit rural peripheries to fuel industrial and urban 
areas. 
Involvement of the private sector in Latin American 
energy development signifies an important political-
economic shift with broad implications for industry, 
trade, tax collection, and much more (Lokey 2009; 
Schreuder 2009). Impacts from neoliberal reforms are 
varied and remain tied to other international and 
domestic policies (Mansfield 2004; Radcliffe 2007). 
For example, the COM transfers extensive author-
ity to the private sector because it is a project-based 
framework often relying on implementation by firms, 
although the vast rule-based structure of the COM 
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maintains an instrumental role for governmental and 
quasi-governmental agencies (Giddens 2009; Bulkeley 
and Newell2010). State agencies continue to influence 
the type, pace, and form of resource commodification 
tied to specific COM projects (Lokey 2009; Schreuder 
2009). 
Processes in Panama reflect the hollowing out of the 
state as responsibility for watershed management, pub-
lic education, and energy infrastructure shifts to the pri-
vate sector. At the same time, authoritarianism seeps 
out of complex rearticulations of governance and regu-
lation (sensu Swyngedouw 2000). The state and private 
sector join forces to constrict local resource access and 
disempower Indigenous peoples, in spite of Panama's 
recognition of semiautonomous indigenous territories 
(comarcas) over the past century.8 Across national and 
institutional landscapes, support for racial and class-
based privilege rooted in colonial and imperial histories 
remains clear (Swyngedouw 2000; Hale 2002, 2004; 
Radcliffe 2007; Jordan 2008). 
When Latin American Indigenous peoples oppose 
development projects, they. might become targets of 
state violence (Radcliffe 2007; Jordan 2008). Yet Hale 
( 2002, 2004) identified concurrent politics of recogni- · 
tion where states legally codify ethnic rights in ways 
that seem progressive but might still be manipulated to 
limit access to land and resources. Tying race relations 
to the valorization of GHGs, Baldwin ( 2009) suggested 
that carbon markets can lead to the entrenchment of 
racial hierarchies and limit Indigenous peoples' eco-
nomic and political options. In western Panama, the 
selective transfer of benefits (e.g., land payments, jobs, 
gifts, carbon credits, etc.) to local individuals willing to 
allow hydro development creates community division 
such that the organization of alternatives or unified op-
position becomes unviable (Jordan 2008). 
Although neither project we assess had been veri-
fied by the COM at the time of writing, project de-
velopers had submitted proposals and, more important, 
justified the dams using global climate change argu-
ments (e.g., AES-Changuinola 2008; Rodriguez 2010).9 
Bonyic developers suggested in their COM application 
that a main motivation for the project was to share car-
bon market benefits with Naso communities (Rodriguez 
2010). 
Hydro Development in Bocas del T oro, 
Panama 
After determining strong hydro potential in Bocas 
del T oro Province in the 1970s, Panama set aside Palo 
Seco Forest Reserve (Figure 1) in the 1980s to protect 
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the watershed for energy production, but state attempts 
to build dams in the region were unsuccessful (Paiement 
2007; Barber 2008; Jordan 2008). Following privatiza-
tion of Panama's Institute of Hydrologic Resources and 
Electrification (IRHE) in 1998, there was vast invest-
ment leading to more than seventy new hydro conces-
sions (Cordero et al. 2006). Eighty percent of Panama's 
two dozen proposed and verified COM projects involve 
dams. 
The Panamanian state plans to redefine Bocas del 
Taro Province. Paiement (2007, 126) described a vi-
sion a governmental official shared with him: "in the 
next ten years the rivers and forests of Bocas del T oro 
will be transformed by a series of dams, artificial lakes, 
access roads, and transmission lines."10 In this context, 
state efforts to assure implementation of the first hydro 
projects in the province, described next, gamer addi-
tional importance. 
Green Authoritarianism in Naso~ Tjerdi 
I didn't know that the development I was promised had 
people in uniforms militarizing our communities ... every 
day more than ten or twelve police enter our 
community .... They are taking care of the machines. 
That is what they do. (Naso leader, conversation, 7 June 
2009) 
This Nasa leader's allegation, supported by other in-
terviews and media coverage, was that Panamanian of-
ficials protect dam construction equipment from sabo-
tage in the face of local resistance. We label this process 
of state oppression to defend renewable energy sources 
and market-valorized ecological processes green author-
itarianism (see Peluso 1992; Neumann 1998). 
As an example of green authoritarianism, Bonyic 
dam obstructed progress toward legal recognition of the 
Nasa homeland (Naso-Tjerdi; Paiement 2007; Jordan 
2008; World Bank Inspection Panel 2009). The Nasa 
were in the final stages of negotiating their comarca 
when the Colombian state utility company EPM (and 
two partner firms with minor holdings) purchased the 
dam concession (Paiement 2007; Jordan 2008). 11 Nasa 
leaders believe demarcation of Naso-Tjerdi was stalled 
to assure dam construction, particularly after Nasa 
began to vocalize opposition to the energy project 
(Anonymous, conversation, 7 June 2009). 
The Nasa are proud to have one of the few remaining 
monarchies in the Americas, but disagreement over the 
Bonyic dam split their kingdom (Paiement 2007). King 
Tito Santana signed a weak agreement in 2003 with the 
firm Hydroecol6gica Teribe (HET), of which EPM is the 
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majority owner (Paiement 2007). Later, HET promised 
to transfer 25 percent of the project's carbon credits to 
the local community (Rodriguez 2010). Santana's co-
operation with HET, however, led many Nasa to accuse 
him of being corrupt, although he maintained support 
from a group offollowers (Paiement 2007; Jordan 2008). 
The majority ofNaso elected a new king, but the Pana-
manian state and private investors continue to recog-
nize Tito Santana. Nasa institutions were sufficiently 
disrupted that in 2004 the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank cancelled loans promised to HET for dam 
construction (Paiement 2004; Rodriguez 2010). 
In June 2009, after HET decided to finance the dam 
with internal funding, the National Environmental Au-
thority (ANAM) granted a 1,246-hectare hydro con-
cession (Rodriguez 2010). Construction began in spite 
ofNaso protests (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). In 
June 2010, Nasa, seeking to halt Bonyic construction, 
filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR). A series of IACHR peti-
tions expose a pattern of Panamanian state oppression 
of Indigenous peoples (see Mayhew, Jordan, and Rol-
nick 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). 
In June 2010, the Bonyic project applied for COM 
verification. According to the application, at the time 
of negotiation with HET, the Nasa were "in the midst 
of a prolonged leadership crisis, caused by historical and 
political factors, as well as by family feuds and personal 
interests" (Rodriguez 2010, 16). This version of history 
removes blame from HET and the Panamanian state, 
although Paiement (2007) provides a detailed firsthand 
account of their involvement in Nasa internal conflicts. 
We have argued elsewhere that COM application 
processes do not provide adequate, accessible opportu-
nities for impacted communities to document concerns 
(Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). In addition to a one-
month public commenting period on the lntemetY 
developers are required to comply with national stan-
dards, as Bonyic did.13 Describing the consultation pro-
cess, the Bonyic COM application vaguely mentions "a 
public discussion with local stakeholders" in 2005, and 
greater attention is drawn to "highly positive" com-
ments generated in Panama City at a clean produc-
tion symposium (Rodriguez 2010, 49). Although it is 
likely COM verifiers will request additional details, 14 
this example suggests applicants might attempt to omit 
essential information. In the next case study, the COM 
application notes "ample support" from local popula-
tions (TOY-SOD 2008, 35), but when the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms of Indigenous peoples visited the 
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Figure 1. Bocas del T oro Province with dam locations. 
project area, he found "significant discontent" (Anaya 
2009, 10, authors' translation). Both statements are se~ 
lectively true, as the dam created a social rift. 
Spatial Control and Social Restructuring in Chan 
7515 
In 2007, Ngobe villagers blocked Chan 75 dam 
construction for two weeks until national police beat 
and arrested protesters, including women and children 
(Barber 2008; Cultural Survival 2008; Jordan 2008). 
Since this protest, national police receiving salaries 
from AES~Changuinola screen movement to and from 
the zone. According to the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the rights of Indigenous peoples, the contractual 
relationship between state security forces and AES~ 
Changuinola is concerning due to evidence of unequal 
power and pressure tactics (Anaya 2009). 
Four Ngobe villages (Changuinola Arriba, Charco 
de la Pava, Nance de Risco, and Valle del Rey) 
are being resettled without free, prior, and informed 
consent (Anaya 2009). AES~Changuinola notes com-
pliance with World Bank standards for involuntary 
resettlement. 16 Based on the 2007 UN Declaration on 
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the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, however, an inter-
national norm Panama supported, involuntary resettle~ 
ment is prohibited in indigenous territories. 
In 2007, Panama's National Assembly Resolution 
Number 1228 decreed that the four Ngobe villages in 
the proposed flood zone would be permitted to stay 
within the Palo Seco Forest Reserve if they relocate to 
allow dam construction (Jordan 2008). Modem Ngobe 
settlements in this area predate the reserve's creation 
(Anaya 2009), but inhabitants were not allowed to reg~ 
ister their lands prior to the dam concession (Jordan 
2008; Mayhew, Jordan, and Rolnick 2009). The World 
Bank loaned funds in 2001 to Panama's National Land 
Administration Program to title Ngobe-Bugle Comarca 
(Figure 1) annex areas (World Bank Inspection Panel 
2009), including Ngobe and Naso villages in this study. 
A decade later these villages remain without land titles. 
AES-Changuinola's 2007 contract with the state 
environmental agency ANAM privatized responsibil-
ity for 6,215 hectares of the Palo Seco Forest Reserve 
(Jordan 2008). Because watershed protection is neces-
sary for hydroelectric production, the firm will restrict 
the clearing of agricultural fields: "[Resettled popula-
tions] are being trained on farming techniques and 
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efficient production. Moreover, they are recetvmg 
training on the sustainable environmental management 
the communities must adhere to" (AES-Changuinola 
2008, 47). 
Company employees designed new forms of subsis-
tence for local populations as tree farmers and as artisans 
producing crafts for tourists expected to visit the arti-
ficial reservoir. Paternalistic social programs followed 
state violence to quell local opposition to the dam 
(Barber 2008; Cultural Survival 2008; Jordan 2008; 
Anaya 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). Spa-
tial control (i.e., fences, travel restrictions, loss of river 
transportation) and pressure tactics (i.e., unwarranted 
house-to-house searches, death threats, destruction of 
crops and property) promoted isolation, fear, and des-
peration (IACHR 2009a). Dynamite blasts were loud 
enough to force school closures in the nearby village of 
Charco de Ia Pava (Figure 2}. 
Chan 75 creates fundamental change in surround-
ing villages and positive social development could be 
possible. For example, AES-Changuirtola (2008) has 
established education and health care programs. Al-
though the firm suggests that these efforts are evidence 
of corporate social responsibility, the investments were 
integral to a broader partnership with state agencies and 
paved the way for AES-Changuinola to receive the hy-
dro concession. Furthermore, AES-Changuinola's so-
cial programs, as well as the firm's commitment to share 
20 percent of earnings from carbon offsets with the 
state environmental agency (Finley-Brook and Thomas 
2010), allows the government of Panama to avoid pay-
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Figure 2. Chan 75 dam in relation to 
a Ngobe village (upper right). Source: 
Photo by Mary Finley-Brook. 
ing for basic programs and services generally defined 
as state responsibilities. Social assistance can also be 
used to counteract allegations of harm caused by dam 
development or to mask other injustices. 
AES-Changuinola's (2008) plans to improve Ngobe 
living conditions create significant cultural change, 
such as splitting multigenerational households into nu-
clear families. Traditional houses were categorized as 
instituting "confinement'' due to "inadequate use of 
conStruction materials" (AES-Changuinola 2008, 43). 
New cement structures are "dignified," in contrast to 
customary wood and palm structures that left inhabi-
tants "exposed to rain and diseases" (AES-Changuinola 
2008, 50). 
AES-Changuinola representatives negotiated relo-
cation accords and compensation for land use by house-
hold, creating upheaval within families because individ-
uals signed resettlement agreements in representation of 
other family members even when they lacked this legal 
right (Lutz 2007; Jordan 2008). Discrete negotiations 
with each household unit were inappropriate because 
land is communally owned (Barber 2008; Jordan 2008). 
The firm's disbursement of gifts and money during ne-
gotiations also contributed to social tension (Jordan 
2008),17 
In 2009, the IACHR advised the Panamanian state 
to halt dam construction and consult with the Ng5be 
in good faith. Negotiations occurred while construc-
tion advanced. Decisive meetings were held in Panama 
City, meaning select village representatives negotiated 
without community support and other villagers were 
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unable to monitor events (Mayhew, Jordan, and Rol-
nick 2009 ). Displeased Ngobe suggest state officials 
made sure that dam opponents were not allowed "at 
the table" (IACHR 2009a, audio recording, authors' 
translation). The accord signed between village and 
state representatives stated that both parties agreed to 
work together to assure timely dam completion. 
The IACHR brought the Panamanian state to the 
Inter-American Human Rights Court (CIDH) in May 
2010. The court decided to disregard the IACHR's rec-
ommendation to halt dam construction because judges 
were not convinced the matter was "extremely serious" 
or "urgent" (CIDH 2010, 9-12, authors' translation). 
Panamanian officials testified that by mid-2010 only 
a handful of families had not signed relocation agree-
ments with AES-Changuinola (CIDH 2010). Judges 
highlighted acceptance of money and land settlements 
on the part of various members of the indigenous com-
munities, while noting the existence of unclear dates 
for alleged death threats and pressure tactics. 
The Chan 75 application has been in the COM 
pipeline since 2008. The verdict remains unclear at 
the time of writing. The consultation process leading 
to the application was poor. ANAM's public meetings 
in reference to the dam in 2005 were held in a town 
located six hours away from the four communities to 
be resettled (Anaya 2009). A letter from members of 
the Charco de la Pava village opposing the project was 
sent to ANAM in 2007 during the prevalidation public 
consultation period for AES-Changuinola's concession, 
hut state officials approved the concession nonetheless 
(Anaya 2009). Chan 75's COM application made no 
mention of the land tenure conflict or social opposition 
(TUV-SUD 2008). No comments were received during 
the thirty-day online COM public commenting period. 
Neocolonial Carbon Projects and 
Indigenous Communities 
Green authoritarianism and carbon colonialism are 
evident in the construction of both the Chan 75 and 
Bonyic dams. In these case studies, state agencies and 
private firms worked in partnership to dominate and 
oppress local populations. With support from the state, 
developers used physical force to assert claims to ex-
ploit or protect natural resources with market value. 
Working in partnership, state actors and private firms 
have obligated Naso and Ngc~be villages to experience 
what Radcliffe (2007) defined as Latin American In-
digenous peoples' geographies of fear and inequitable 
development. 
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Our research suggests GHG reduction projects in 
indigenous territories can adversely affect local self-
governance, land tenure, resource access, and subsis-
tence practices (see also Lohmann 2006; Baldwin 2009; 
Lovbrand, Rindefjall, and Nordqvist 2009; Mate and 
Ghosh 2009; Hazlewood forthcoming). The protection 
of cultural rights is lacking in COM requirements and 
Indigenous peoples have insufficient influence over car-
bon offset decisions (see also Finley-Brook and Thomas 
2010). For example, there are no COM guidelines to 
protect cultural heritage. We are aware of two Pana-
manian projects in the COM pipeline that destroyed or 
displaced ancient ancestral sites including cemeteries. 
Hydro development and carbon markets involve spa-
tial imbalance in terms of the distribution of costs and 
benefits. Although Latin American COM projects are 
often linked to high-stake energy markets, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
oversight processes focused on GHG emissions cur-
rently lack safeguards against exclusionary and harmful 
practices. Findings from our two cases suggest that the 
COM might contribute to hydrologic neocolonialism 
in some instances; however, constraints to local par-
ticipation arc not limited to dam projects. Regardless 
of COM project type, greater attention appears nec-
essary to defend local populations from authoritarian 
spatial control linked to the imposition of externally 
defined institutional arrangements and neoliberal eco-
logical practices. 
We expect that solving social justice issues in inter-
national carbon offset and renewable energy projects 
will be complex. For example, stipulations such as pro-
hibiting COM projects in untitled indigenous territories· 
could create perverse incentives for the privatization of 
communal property if broader sociopolitical injustices 
arc not addressed first. Although the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides important 
guidelines, its impact might remain limited if even the 
Inter-American Human Rights Court averts the Dec-
laration's fundamental call for free, prior, and informed 
consent, as apparently occurred in the case of Chan 
75. For low-carbon development to be considered truly 
"clean," it is necessary to eliminate pervasive social in-
equalities and oppression in addition to reducing GHG 
emissions. 
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Notes 
1. Additionality suggests that a project would not have 
occurred without CDM finance. See Schneider (2009) 
for problems associated with assuring additionality. 
2. Emissions markets separate GHGs from other elements 
in the development equation, such as ecosystem in-
tegrity and community resilience. Carbon calculations 
remain imperfect (e.g., exaggerated baselines, indirect 
emissions, externalities, exceptions for transportation, 
etc.; Lohmann 2006; Haya 2007; Gilbertson and Reyes 
2009). 
3. We also assessed older darns in Chiriqui and Panam'\ 
Provinces (see Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). 
4. Although we record material flows, we recognize limita-
tions to this approach because value cannot be placed 
on key components such as cultural change. 
5. Updates can be found at http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-
projects-type.htm (last accessed 7 April 2011). 
6. A guide to the COM project cycle can be found at 
http://www .undp.org/energy/docs/cdmchapter 2. pdf (last 
accessed 7 April2011). 
7. Founded in 1981 as Applied Energy Systems, the name 
was changed to AES Corporation and later shortened. 
8. Sec Paiement (2007) and Jord<~n (2008) for details about 
comarca recognition. 
9. Both firms have implemented carbon offsets in other 
locations, including indigenous territories (Lokey 2009; 
Wittman and Caron 2009; Finley-Brook and Thomas 
2010). 
10. In this article we focus on the role of national-level state 
actors. Lutz (2007), Paiement (2007), Jordan (2008), 
and Mayhew, Jorthin, and Rolnick (2009) documented 
how the actions of provincial officials generally coincide 
with central government efforts. 
11. The Naso and Ng(Sbe in Bocas del Toro refused entry into 
the Ngt)be-Bugle Co marc a (Figure l) when it was formed 
in 1997 due to cuncerns over representation (Paiement 
2007; Jordan 2008). 
12. Fewer than 10 percent of verified Central American 
CDMs {2005-2008) received online comments (Finley-
Brook and Thomas 2010). 
13. See Paiement (2007) for details. 
14. A CDM applicant is responsible for contracting a UN-
designated operational entity (DOE) to carry out verifi-
cation. The contractual h1sis of this relationship might 
create situations where DOEs are biased toward approval 
because rejecting projects could harm their ability to ob-
tain future Clllltracts. 
15. This dam is sometimes referred to as Changuinola 1 or 
Chan 1. 
16. A 2009 AES-Changuinola slideshow is available from 
the authors. 
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17. Derails of financial settlements have not been pub-
licly disclosed. Resettlement contracts transferring land 
holdings were signed with one person in family, 
even though in some instances other family members 
were opposed to relocation (Jord<1n 2008). Firm repre-
sentatives pressured illiterate individuals to "sign" (by 
thumbprint) resettlement agreements (Lutz 2007; Jord,in 
2008). 
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